


















































































































E-mail: cummins@wharton.upenn.eduPRODUCTIVITY AND TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IN THE
ITALIAN INSURANCE INDUSTRY
1.  Introduction
The European insurance industry has traditionally been tightly regulated and largely sheltered
from competition across national borders.  This situation is changing dramatically with European
economic unity, especially as the European Union's (EU) third-generation directives, introduced in July
1994, become more fully implemented.  Insurers have begun to compete vigorously across national
boundaries, and this trend is expected to accelerate over the next few years.   A wave of industry
restructuring has been underway for some time, characterized by both intra-market consolidations and
cross-market acquisitions and alliances (Parker, 1992).  
This more dynamically competitive market has placed downward pressure on profit margins and
led to an increased emphasis on operating efficiency in the industry (Muth, 1993).  A study of efficiency
in the French insurance industry showed a wide dispersion in efficiency among firms in the industry,
which could be explained only partially by firm characteristics such as scale and distribution system
(Fecher, et al., 1993).  Although this is perhaps not surprising in a market that has been relatively
sheltered from competition, the more dynamic market resulting from European unity can be expected
to put additional pressure on the less efficient insurers.  
In evaluating European markets, it is important to have better measures of the extent and
dispersion of efficiency and productivity growth.  Such information would be helpful to regulators in
evaluating the impact of changing market structure, to insurers and other firms seeking to acquire
subsidiaries or establish alliances, and to securities markets and buyers evaluating the prospects of
particular insurers and national markets.  Other than the study by Fecher, et al., 1993, efficiency in2
1For analyses of other types of European financial institutions, see Grifell-Tatjé and
Lovell, 1993, Dietsch, 1993, and Muldur and Sassenou, 1993.
2Regulatory changes sometimes can have unexpected and unintended consequences.  E.g.,
Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1993, found that productivity declined following the deregulation of
Spanish savings banks.
European insurance markets has not been analyzed using modern frontier-efficiency models.
1  
The purpose of this paper is to partially fill this gap in the existing literature by conducting an
analysis of technical efficiency and productivity growth in the Italian insurance industry.  The analysis
makes use of a detailed data base on Italian life and non-life insurance companies over the period 1985-
1993, provided by the Associazione Nazionale fra le Impresse Assicurazioni (ANIA), the Italian
association of insurance companies.  Because our sample period spans the period of initial
implementation of European economic unity, we are able to provide information on the effect of this
deregulation on efficiency in the Italian insurance market. 
Analysis of the Italian market is also especially interesting because of the dramatic changes that
have occurred in the market during the past decade (see, for example, Arthur Anderson & Co., 1990,
Turchetti, 1994).  The Italian life insurance market experienced rapid premium growth during this
period (more than 26 percent per year from 1983-1993), spurred by a crisis in the Italian social security
pension system and innovations in life insurance savings products.   Insurers also experimented with
new distribution channels, which have taken market share from the traditionally dominant exclusive
agents.  The government authorization in 1990 for banks to own majority shareholdings in insurance
companies represented a major structural change that also is expected to have an impact on productivity
and efficiency.
2  The bank marketing channel ("bancassurance") has been especially successful in life
insurance, capturing 32 percent of new life insurance sales (premium volume) in 1993.  The Italian non-
life insurance industry remains somewhat problematical, experiencing high loss ratios and low profits.3
Our analysis can help to identify firms and firm-characteristics that are associated with relatively high
and low efficiency in this market.   
We measure technical efficiency (the effectiveness of the use of technology at a given point in
time), changes in technical efficiency over time, and technical change (changes in technology) over time
for a sample of Italian insurers and use the results to test hypotheses regarding industrial organization
and to analyze trends associated with structural developments in the market.  Data envelopment analysis
(DEA) is used to estimate production frontiers for each year of the sample period (see, for example, Ali
and Seiford, 1993, Grosskopf, 1993).  A production frontier gives the minimum inputs required to
produce any given output vector.  DEA estimates the frontiers by solving a series of linear programming
problems.  The efficiency of each firm is then measured by computing its distance from the frontiers.
Efficiency ranges from 0 to 1, with a firm operating on the frontier (efficiency of 1) measured as fully
efficient.  We also measure productivity growth over time, where productivity growth is defined as the
change in output due to technical efficiency change and technical change over time (see Grosskopf,
1993, and Fare, et al., 1994).  To measure efficiency change and technical change, we adopt the
Malmquist index approach (see Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1993, Färe, et al., 1994), which is also a DEA-
based methodology.  
An important reason for conducting the analysis presented in this paper is to provide benchmark
statistics to facilitate comparisons of efficiency and productivity under the new European regulatory
regime when data on more recent periods become available.   In addition, the production frontier results
are used to test hypotheses about two major issues in industrial organization:  the coexistence of
alternative product distribution systems and organizational forms in an industry.  These issues have been
widely analyzed with respect to the U.S. insurance industry but have been rarely analyzed in European4
3An important exception is the analysis of the French insurance industry by Fecher, et al.,
1993.  
insurance markets using the frontier efficiency approach.
3  Both issues are of great importance in the
Italian insurance market (Turchetti, 1994).
2.  An Overview of the Italian Insurance market
Compared to insurance markets in other industrialized countries, the Italian insurance market
is relatively underdeveloped.   Italy ranks seventh among developed countries in insurance premium
volume but ranks twenty-second in premiums as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and
twentieth in premiums per capita (see Table 1).   The underdeveloped condition of the Italian insurance
market on the one hand may imply inefficiency and low competition but on the other offers significant
opportunities for development and growth.  
Automobile insurance is the most important line of business in the Italian market, accounting
for about 40 percent of premiums in 1993 (see Table 2).  However, the relative importance of life
insurance has increased dramatically during the past ten years.  Life insurance premiums have grown
at an annual percentage rate of 26.3 percent, and life insurance now accounts for 30 percent of Italian
premium volume.  The combined growth rate for all other lines of business was 12.9 percent over the
same period (Table 2).  
The increasing importance of life insurance is attributable in part to the crisis in the Italian social
security pension system, which has led consumers to rely more heavily on personal savings for their
retirement income.  Italy has always had a relatively high rate of personal savings, but high interest rates
on Italian government bonds have historically attracted savings away from private savings vehicles such
as life insurance.  However, due to the increasing financial sophistication of consumers, the entry of
new firms in the life market, and the use of innovative channels of distribution, life insurance has begun5
4Other channels of distribution less linked to the company are sub-agents and part-time
agents.
to attract a higher proportion of consumer savings.  The growth of the life insurance market has focused
more attention on the need to reduce costs, especially marketing costs, and to achieve higher levels of
efficiency in the industry.  
Return on equity in the industry has been relatively low, averaging 6.1 percent from 1983-1992
and 4.4 percent from 1988-1992.   This poor performance can be traced in part to high loss ratios in
non-life insurance, primarily due to compulsory automobile liability insurance and marine insurance.
 Improvements in the profitability are expected following  price deregulation in July 1994.
In 1993 there were 274 insurers in the Italian market, an increase of 63 during the ten-year
period ending in 1993 (see Table 3).  The vast majority of companies are domestic stock companies.
By 1993 there were 12 mutuals, one cooperative insurer, and 50 foreign insurers in the market.  In 1993,
191 companies participated in the non-life insurance market, an increase of 10 companies since 1984.
The number of companies in the life insurance market grew from 54 in 1984 to 99 in 1993.
Insurance is distributed through a variety of distribution channels in the Italian market.  The
“traditional” channels are exclusive agents, independent agents, direct sales through company
 employees, and brokers.
4  Among the “innovative” forms are banks, SIM, financial consultants, direct
marketing (mail and telemarketing), and automated distribution.  Table 4 shows the market shares of
the principal distribution channels in 1992.  Agents account for 75.6 percent of the non-life insurance
market and 55.5 percent of the life insurance market.  Banks and direct sales represent 40 percent of the
life insurance market but only about 9 percent of the non-life insurance market.  The market share of
banks has increased dramatically since 1990, when banks were permitted to own majority shareholdings
of insurers.6
5The sale of insurance through banks is also important in other European countries.  In
1992, for example, the share of life insurance premiums collected through banks was 46 percent
in France (and increase of 26 percentage points since 1983), 8 percent in Germany, and 22
percent in Spain.  The banking channel also offers possibilities for the distribution of non-life
insurance. 
As in other European countries, we observe a progressive decrease of the role of traditional
marketing channels in the Italian market, especially of exclusive agents, in favor of the distribution
systems of other financial institutions and non-financial firms. The share of premiums collected by
exclusive agents, in fact, decreased from 82 percent in 1980 to 70 percent in 1992. 
As in other countries, the channel of distribution that is showing the fastest development is the
banking channel. This phenomenon, best known by the french term “bancassurance,” is one of the most
important developments taking place in the financial sector.
5 At the end of 1994, there were 25
companies in Italy specializing in bancassurance.  Of the 25 companies, 11 are owned by banks, 4 are
in consortiums, 7 have a major control, and 3 are controlled by insurance companies.  An extensive
series of commercial agreements governs the interactions among banks and insurance companies.
Insurance companies, attracted to the banking channel because of the lower distribution costs,
also can benefit from bank customer relationships that facilitate cross selling and the customer access
provided by networks of branch banks.  Economies of  scope may arise from a reduction in the search,
information, monitoring, and/or transaction costs borne by the end-user of financial products.  Costs
may be significantly reduced when several financial products are purchased from the same firm.
The introduction of  new entrants and distribution systems is part of a process of change of the
European financial market in general and of the Italian market in particular. In the last fifteen years,
numerous events have taken place that have reduced existing barriers among financial institutions and
countries and increased the competitive pressures in the market.  The following are among the important
factors:7
6With costly contracting, agency costs are generated by incentive conflicts among parties
to a contract (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Agency costs are defined as all costs incurred in
attempting to control agency conflicts as well as the residual costs that remain because the costs
of full enforcement of the contract exceed the benefits.
C changes in the national and the EC law systems reducing the barriers among the financial
institutions and increasing the information transparency between the insurer/distributor and the
customer;
C the development of new communication and information technologies and of new management
methods (with the consequent increase of information transmission between the insurer and the
distributors);
C the increased financial sophistication of customers, who are more interested in financial problems,
better educated, and more demanding;
C the internationalization of markets;
C the increased importance of insurance products in families* savings portfolios;
• the growing inadequacy of social security pension systems and the consequent increase in the
demand for life insurance products; and
C the birth of new financial intermediaries.
Our study will provide benchmark efficiency estimates for the Italian industry to help gauge the future
impact of these and other developments.
3. Hypotheses 
Agency theory predicts that the organizations that survive in an economic activity are those that
deliver the desired product at the lowest possible price while covering agency costs and the costs of
production (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b).
6  The insurance industry
provides an interesting environment in which to study agency theoretic  hypotheses because different
distribution systems and organizational forms coexist in the industry.  For example, the Italian insurance
industry consists of stock and mutual insurers; and Italian firms distribute their products using exclusive8
7The stock form of ownership provides several mechanisms for controlling managers that
are not available to mutuals, including the alienability of residual claims, proxy fights, and the
market for takeovers (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). 
agents, independent agents, brokers, financial consultants, and banks (bancassurance).  A variety of
insurance products is offered by the industry that differ significantly in risk, complexity, and the need
for managerial expertise and control and thus vary in their potential to generate agency costs.
An extensive literature has developed on organizational form in insurance leading to two major
hypotheses.  The 'expense preference hypothesis' of organizational form predicts that mutuals will have
higher costs than stocks because the mutual form of ownership affords owners less effective
mechanisms for controlling and disciplining managers (e.g., Mester, 1989).
7   Thus, the managers of
mutuals may engage in excessive consumption of perquisites (expense preference behavior), and mutual
managers may be less likely than stock managers to pursue the owners' objective of maximizing profits.
Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) hypothesize that stocks and mutuals will be sorted into market
segments where they have comparative advantages in dealing with various types of principal-agent
problems.  The 'managerial discretion hypothesis' predicts that stock insurers should be more successful
in lines of insurance requiring relatively high levels of managerial discretion because stock ownership
provides a superior mechanism for controlling principal-agent conflicts between managers and owners
(Mayers and Smith, 1988).  Agency theory also predicts that mutuals should be relatively successful in
lines of insurance where policyholder-owner conflicts are important, because the mutual form merges
the policyholder and ownership functions.
The expense preference hypothesis predicts that mutuals will be less efficient than stocks.
However, if firms are sorted into market segments on the basis of their ability to control different types
of principal-agent problems, firms may be equally efficient in the market segments where they have
comparative advantages.  If the lines of business underwritten by stocks and mutuals differ significantly9
in risk or complexity, mutuals might operate more efficiently than stocks if they have a comparative
advantage in less risky or less complex lines where there is a lower probability of making suboptimal
technological choices.
An extensive literature also exists on the coexistence of alternative distribution systems in
insurance markets.  Early research in the United States found that independent agency insurers have
higher costs than insurers using the exclusive agency or direct marketing systems (Joskow, 1973) and
debate has centered on the degree to which the higher costs of independent agency firms represent
inefficiencies as opposed to higher service intensity that is valued by the buyer (Pauly, Kleindorfer, and
Kunreuther, 1986, Berger, Cummins, and Weiss, 1995).  
Those advancing the service intensity argument rely on agency theory to predict that independent
agents will be relatively successful when the potential for conflict between the insurer and the
policyholder is relatively strong (Kim, Mayers, and Smith, 1995).  For example, in lines of insurance
where losses are relatively large and claims settlement is relatively complex, independent agents may
be more effective than exclusive agents because they can intervene with the company to obtain a fair
settlement for the policyholder.  Because of their ownership of the customer list, independent agents
can credibly use the threat to switch the policyholder to another insurer if the company is uncooperative.
Likewise, it is more efficient to give the ownership of residual rights to the actor whose initial
investment is more important (Grossman and Hart, 1986).  Thus, in activities where the agent makes
a relatively large investment in acquiring the customer, it is likely to be optimal for agents to legally
own the relationship with the client (typically the customer list).  This again leads to the prediction that
independent agents should be the preferred distribution channel for complex types of insurance where
acquiring the customer relationship and designing the coverage program are relatively costly.
On the other hand, in market segments where the need for specialized services is relatively low,10
such as in standardized mass-marketed coverages, exclusive agents are likely to be more effective.  In
marketing standardized coverages, insurers tend to rely more  heavily on advertising, providing the
opportunity for the independent agent to expropriate the benefits of an insurer's advertising expenditures
by placing new customers with other companies.  The use of exclusive dealing contracts eliminates or
greatly reduces this incentive conflict (Marvel, 1982).  
As in the case of organizational form, these agency theoretic arguments imply that alternative
distribution systems are expected to be relatively successful in market segments where they are most
efficient.  Thus, we would not necessarily expect to observe efficiency differentials associated with the
choice of distribution system in a competitive insurance market.  If independent agency insurers tend
to be dominant in complex markets where there is a high investment in acquiring and retaining
customers, technical efficiencies might be higher because the decision making process provides more
opportunities to choose suboptimal technologies.  
Because of the likelihood that insurers with different organizational forms and distribution
systems are sorted into market segments based on agency costs and other factors, after estimating
efficiency we conduct an ex post regression analysis with the efficiency scores as dependent variables
and various firm characteristics as independent variables.  This allows us to measure the effect of
organizational form and distribution systems on efficiency while controlling for other influential factors.
4.  Methodology and Data
This section discusses the DEA methodology used to estimate technical efficiency, changes in
technical efficiency, and technical change over time.  We then discuss the measurement of outputs and
inputs and describe our sample.
Technical Efficiency  
To analyze production frontiers, we employ the input distance function introduced by Shephard11
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(see, for example, Groskopf, 1993).  Suppose producers use input vector x = ( x1, x2,... xk )  0 ú+
k  to
produce output vector y = ( y1, y2, ..yn )  0 ú+
n.  A production technology which transforms inputs into
outputs can be modeled by an input correspondence  y 6 V(y) f ú+
k.  For any  y  0 ú+
n,  V(y) denotes
the subset of all input vectors x  0  ú+
k  which yield at least y.  V(y) is assumed to satisfy certain axioms
(see  Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell, 1985).  The input distance function is defined by
The input distance function is the same as the reciprocal of the minimum equi-proportional contraction
of the input vector x, given outputs y, i.e., Farrell's measure of input technical efficiency.   Input
technical efficiency TE(x,y) is therefore defined as
TE(x,y) for each decision making unit can be easily obtained by linear programming, incorporating
various assumptions regarding the reference technology, i.e., constant, non-increasing, non-decreasing,
and variable returns to scale.
To provide some intuition into the interpretation of the input distance function, consider the
single output, single input frontier portrayed in Figure 1.  The lines V
t and V
t+1 represent the production
frontiers in periods t and t+1, respectively.  The boundary V
t represents the minimum inputs needed to
produce any given level of output in period t.  Thus, input-output combinations observed among firms
in period t lie on or to the right of V
t.  Firms on the frontier are considered fully efficient, while those
to the right of V
t are inefficient.  The type of efficiency considered here is technical efficiency, i.e., firms
on the frontier are using the most efficient available technology, while those to the right of the frontier12
are not using this technology.  





represent, respectively, the firm's input and output in period t.    The firm's input quantity x
t is
represented by the distance 0e along the horizontal axis.   By adopting the most efficient technology,
this firm could operate on the frontier, using input quantity 0b.  The value of the input distance function
for this firm is equal to 0e/0b, and its Farrell technical efficiency ratio is the reciprocal 0b/0e.  The input
distance function value, D(x
t,y
t) = 0e/0b $ 1, while its Farrell technical efficiency, TE = 0b/0e # 1.
If technology is improving over time, we will observe shifts in the frontier.  For example, in
Figure 1, the frontier labelled V
t+1 represents the frontier in period t+1.  The improved technology
represented by V
t+1 enables efficient firms to produce all levels of output using less of the input than
was required by technology V
t .   For example, suppose that our hypothetical firm has input-output
combination (x
t+1,y
t+1) in period t+1.   Because of technical progress, this firm operates to the left of V
t,
i.e., its input-output combination would have been infeasible using period t technology, but is feasible
using period t+1 technology.  This firm is also more efficient relative to the period t+1 frontier than it
was relative to the period t frontier, because its operating point is closer to the frontier in t+1.  In
distance function terms, D
t+1(x
t+1,y
t+1) = 0d/oc < D
t(x
t,y
t) = 0e/0b, where superscripts on D indicate the
time period of the frontier from which the distance is computed.
Distance functions are estimated by solving linear programming problems.  For example, the
distance function is obtained by solving the following linear programming model, for each firm,  i =
1,2,... I, for each year of the sample period (time superscripts are suppressed):13
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where X is an K x I input matrix and Y an N x I output matrix for all sample firms, Xi is a K x 1 input
vector and Yi an N x 1 output vector of firm i, and 8i is an I x 1 intensity vector (the inequalities are
interpreted as applying to each row of the relevant matrix).  
Technical Efficiency Change and Technical Change  
To measure technical efficiency change and technical change (shifts in the frontier) over time,
we adopt the Malmquist index approach (see Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1993, Färe, et al., 1994).  To
define the Malmquist index for the production frontier, we modify equation (1) to incorporate time, as
follows:
where D
t represents the distance function at time t and x
t and y
t are the input and output vectors at time
t.  We also define input distance functions with respect to two different time periods as
     
  (5)14
8Because our Malmquist productivity index is input-oriented, the numerator and
denominator are reversed compared with those in Färe et al. (1994), in which they use output-
oriented Malmquist index.
    
(8)
(9)
In equation (5), the input-output bundle in time period t+1 is evaluated relative to the technology of time
period t; while in equation (6) the input-output bundle observed in period t is evaluated relative to the
technology of time t+1.  
Malmquist productivity indices can be defined relative to either the technology in period t or the
technology in period t+1, as follows:
where M
t measures productivity growth between periods t and t+1 using the technology in period t as
the reference technology, while M
t+1 measures productivity growth with respect to the technology in
period t+1.   To avoid an arbitrary choice of reference technology, the input-oriented Malmquist
productivity index is defined as the geometric mean of M
t and M
t+1 (see Färe, et al., 1994):
8 
This productivity index can be decomposed into measures of technical efficiency change and
technical change, by factoring as follows:
The first ratio in equation (9), in parentheses, represents technical efficiency change, i.e., the relative15
          
(10)
distance of the input-output bundle from the frontier in periods t and t+1.  Recall that both the
numerator and denominator of the ratio must be $ 1 and that values closer to 1 represent higher
efficiency.  Thus, if technical efficiency is higher in period t+1 than in period t, the value of this ratio
will be > 1; while if efficiency declines between the two periods, the value of the ratio will be < 1.  In
terms of Figure 1, technical efficiency change is measured as the ratio [(0e/0b)/(0d/0c)].  The second
factor in equation (9) is a geometric mean, representing technical change (shifts in the frontier) between
periods t and t+1.  If technical improvement occurs, the frontier will shift to the left (see Figure 1), and
both ratios comprising the geometric mean will exceed 1.  Thus, values of the second factor > 1 imply
technical progress and values < 1 imply technical regress.  In terms of Figure 1, the technical change
component of the Malmquist index is measured as: {[(0d/oc)/(0d/0f)][(0e/0a)/(0e/0b)]}
1/2. 
The distance functions (equation (4), (5) and (6)) are measured by solving mathematical
programming problems similar to expression (3).  E.g., for firm i, the distance of the time t input-output
bundle from the time t+1 frontier, i.e., D
t+1(xi
t,yi
t ) can be obtained by solving the following problem:
where Y
t+1 is the NxI output matrix for all sample firms at time t+1, Y
t
i is the Nx1 output vector for firm
i at time t, X
t+1 is the KxI input matrix for all sample firms at time t+1, X
t
i is the Kx1 input vector for
firm i at time t, and 8 8 8 8i is the intensity vector for firm i. 
Outputs, Inputs, and Sample Selection
To estimate our input distance functions, we need measures of output and input quantities.  This16
9Efforts to apply the user cost method in banking found that the classifications of inputs
and outputs were not robust to the choice of opportunity cost estimates nor were they robust over
time (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992).
sections defines these variables and discusses the sample used to estimate the models.
Defining and Measuring Output.  Insurers are analogous to other firms in the financial sector
of the economy in that their outputs consist primarily of services, many of which are intangible.  Three
principal approaches have been used to measure outputs in the financial services sector:  the asset or
intermediation approach, the user-cost approach, and the value-added approach (see Berger and
Humphrey, 1992).  The asset approach treats financial service firms as pure financial intermediaries,
borrowing funds from one set of decision makers, transforming the resulting liabilities into assets, and
receiving and paying out interest to cover the time value of funds used in this capacity.  The asset
approach would be inappropriate for most insurers because they provide many services in addition to
financial intermediation.  In fact, the intermediation function is somewhat incidental to property-liability
insurers, arising out of the contract enforcement costs that would be incurred if  premiums were not paid
in advance of covered loss events.   Intermediation is a very important function for most life insurers,
but they also provide "risk" products such as term and group life insurance, which involve services other
than intermediation.
The user cost method determines whether a financial product is an input or output on the basis
of its net contribution to the revenues of the financial institution.  If the financial returns on an asset
exceed the opportunity cost of funds or if the financial costs of a liability are less than the opportunity
costs, then the product is considered to be a financial output.  Otherwise, it is classified as a financial
input.  This method is theoretically sound but requires precise data on product revenues and opportunity
costs, which are difficult to estimate.
9  It is particularly inaccurate in industries such as insurance,17
because insurance policies bundle together many services (risk pooling, claims settlement,
intermediation, etc.), which are priced implicitly.
Consistent with most of the recent banking literature (e.g., Berger and Humphrey, 1992, Berger,
Hancock, and Humphrey, 1987), we adopt a modified version of the value-added approach to measure
property-liability insurer outputs.  The value-added approach considers all asset and liability categories
to have some output characteristics rather than distinguishing inputs from outputs in a mutually
exclusive way.  The categories having significant value-added, as judged using operating cost
allocations, are employed as important outputs.  Others are treated as unimportant outputs, intermediate
products, or inputs, depending on the characteristics of the specific activity under consideration.  
In general, insurers provide three principal services:
! Risk-pooling and risk-bearing.  Insurance provides a mechanism for consumers and
businesses exposed to life, health, or property-liability losses to engage in risk reduction through
the diversification effect of pooling.  Insurers collect premiums from their customers and
redistribute most of the funds to those policyholders who sustain losses.  The actuarial,
underwriting, and related expenses incurred in operating the risk pool are a major component
of value added in the industry. 
! "Real" financial services relating to insured losses.  Insurers provide a variety of real
services for policyholders.  These include risk surveys to identify unusual loss exposures and
the design of programs to cover these and other risks, and recommendations regarding
deductibles and policy limits. Loss settlement services include valuation of property losses,
negotiations with contractors, and legal representation for liability claims.  By contracting with
insurers to provide theses services, policyholders can take advantage of insurers' extensive
experience and specialized expertise to reduce costs associated with insurable risks.  Life
insurers often provide employee benefit plan administrative services in addition to protection
and investment products.
! Intermediation.  Italian life insurers are heavily involved in financial intermediation,
competing with banks and other financial institutions for consumer savings.  For property-
liability insurance, intermediation is more of an incidental function, but investment income still
constitutes a substantial component of revenues. Thus, it is important to recognize the role of
insurers in providing value-added through intermediation.  
Ideally, we would have available transactions flow data to measure the outputs provided by18
insurers.  This would include information on the number of applications processed, the number of
policies issued and renewed, the number of claims settled, etc.  Unfortunately, this type of
information is not publicly available. 
A satisfactory proxy for the amount of risk-pooling and real insurance services provided in
property-liability insurance is the value of real losses incurred.  Losses incurred are defined as loss
amounts that are expected to be paid as the result of providing insurance coverage during a particular
period of time.  Because the objective of risk-pooling is to collect funds from the policyholder pool
and redistribute them to those who incur losses, proxying output by the amount of losses incurred
seems quite appropriate.  Losses are also a satisfactory proxy for the amount of real services
provided, since the amount of claims settlement and risk management services also should be highly
correlated with loss aggregates.  Because underwriting risk and service intensity vary by line of
business in property-liability insurance in Italy, we disaggregate losses into four categories: auto
property insurance, auto liability insurance, other long-tail insurance (primarily commercial liability),
and other short-tail insurance (including commercial and personal property coverages).   
The corresponding concept to incurred losses in life insurance is benefits incurred plus
changes in reserves (see Yuengert, 1993).   Losses incurred and benefits incurred plus changes in
reserves are deflated to real terms using the Italian gross domestic product (GDP) deflator.
The output of the intermediation function is total invested assets.   Assets are expressed in real terms
by dividing by the GDP deflator.  
Defining and Measuring Inputs.  Insurer inputs can be classified into four principal groups:
acquisition (marketing and product distribution) inputs (mainly agent labor), managerial and
administrative labor, fixed capital (office buildings and computers), and financial equity capital.  Labor,
fixed capital, and financial equity capital are the factors of production for insurers.  Equity capital is a19
10Some data were also available for 1983 and 1984, but we were unable to use these years
due to data quality problems.
primary input into the risk pooling and risk bearing function, because insurers must maintain equity
capital to back their promise to pay losses that are larger than expected.  We developed price deflators
for these inputs based on Italian economic data from both OECD and Italian sources.  For example, the
quantity of labor input is defined as labor costs divided by a weighted average salary and rental deflator,
which index respectively the total labor costs per employee for Italian service industry employees and
Italian property rental costs.  Equity capital is deflated by the Italian GDP deflator.  
The Sample.   We estimate distance functions using detailed financial statement data on  Italian
life and non-life insurance companies over the period 1985-1993, provided by the Associazione
Nazionale fra le Impresse Assicurazioni (ANIA), the Italian association of insurance companies.
10
Detailed balance sheet and income statement data are available as well as premium writings and
incurred and paid losses by line of insurance.  The data are supplemented by price deflators, wage
indices, and other aggregate economic data from the OECD and Italian sources.  Since many Italian
insurers write both life and non-life insurance, we conduct a single estimation including both life and
non-life insurance outputs.  We also conduct separate estimations including and excluding
Assicurazioni Generali, the dominant Italian insurer, to test for possible biases in the results for smaller
insurers due to significant differences in scale between Generali and most other companies.  
The total number of companies in the Italian market ranges from 212 to 274 over our sample
period.  However, many of these companies are quite small, and some were inactive for much of the
period.  Data problems also were created by mergers and acquisitions.  When a merger or acquisition
occurs, ANIA combines the data for the companies involved in the merger, even for earlier years when
the companies involved operated independently.  We found that the inclusion of these "fictitious"20
11To check robustness, we also estimated efficiency using the maximum number of firms
available for each year.  The results will be reported in the next version of the paper.  We also
plan to analyze productivity change for the insurers involved in mergers. 
merged companies created problems in analyzing the data and affected the reasonableness of the results,
particularly at the mid-point of the sample period (1988) when changes in reporting procedures
occurred.  Fortunately, however, only a few companies were involved in mergers, and we were able to
eliminate the merged firms while retaining most of the primary insurers in the Italian market.   
We also sought to create a complete panel of insurers (i.e., insurers were included in the sample
only if data were available for all years), in order to avoid potential biases in the analysis of efficiency
change and technical change over time.  Such biases might occur, for example, if especially efficient
or inefficient firms were included in making year-to-year efficiency and productivity comparisons for
part but not all of the sample period.  Part of the change in efficiency and productivity would then
reflect changes in the companies included in the sample rather than changes in efficiency and
productivity for a given set of firms.  After eliminating extremely small firms, inactive firms, and firms
available for only part of the sample period, the complete panel sample consisted of 94 companies.
11
This set of companies represented xx percent of premiums in the Italian market (average for the sample
period).  Summary statistics for the firms in the sample are presented in Table 5.  
5.  Results
This section first discusses the estimated technical efficiency for the Italian insurance industry,
and then traces technical efficiency change and technical change over the sample period.  We next
present the results of our ex post regression analysis where we test for differences in efficiency by
organizational form and distribution system, holding constant other firm characteristics.
Technical Efficiency
The technical efficiency results are presented in Table 6.  The technical efficiency scores21
12Our efficiency analysis is conducted under the assumption of constant returns to scale. 
Results based on variable returns to scale will be presented in the next version of the paper. 
However, constant returns to scale is not viewed as an unusally restrictive assumption in this type
of analysis (Grosskopf, 1993).  Constant returns to scale is imposed in each period, but firms are
allowed to have completely different constant returns to scale technologies in different periods.
presented in the table are geometric means over the firms in the sample for each year of the sample
period.
12  For example, the geometric mean technical efficiency for the firms in the sample in 1986 was
0.7075.  The mean technical efficiency ranges between 0.7052 in 1987 and 0.7755 in 1991, averaging
0.7370.  These results imply that insurers could have produced their output vectors, on average, with
about 25 percent less inputs if they had operated on the production frontier.  The table also shows the
number of firms with technical efficiencies equal to 1.0, i.e., firms that are operating on the best practice
frontier.  These firms are termed "self-efficient" because no combination of other firms in the sample
could produce their output vector using a smaller amount of inputs.  
The technical efficiency results suggest that significant efficiency gains could be achieved in the
Italian market if more insurers were to adopt "best practice" technologies.  In addition to physical
technologies such as computer and communications systems, technology in the sense used here also
includes all of the contractual arrangements that comprise the firm as well as its organizational
hierarchies, work processes, personnel and training programs, etc.  Technology  refers to any
organizational design feature that affects the way that inputs (labor, fixed capital, and equity capital)
are transformed into outputs (services provided by the insurer).  
Our estimates of technical efficiency in the Italian insurance industry are higher than the DEA
estimates presented by Fecher, et al. (1993) for the French insurance industry.  For the sample period
1984-1989, Fecher, et al. (1993) show an average technical efficiency for the French non-life insurance
industry ranging between 0.504 and 0.537, depending upon the output measures used in the analysis,
and between 0.328 and 0.398 for French life insurers, again depending on choice of output measures.22
13 Cost efficiency includes both technical efficiency and allocative efficiency (a measure
of the firm's success in choosing cost minimizing combinations of inputs).
14Other things equal, the econometric frontier approach should give higher efficiency
scores than DEA because it is designed to filter out random noise from inefficiency, whereas
DEA measures any departure from the frontier as inefficiency. 
15Comparisons of results from different frontiers are likely to be misleading for a number
of reasons.  One problem is that insurance outputs may consist of different services in different
countries or similar services provided in different proportions.  For example, legal services are
more important in the U.S. than in most European countries.  Even if services provided were
fully homogeneous, insurers in one sample could be using a technology that dominates the
technology used by firms in another sample.  Insurers in the former sample could be less efficient
relative to their own production frontier but still use smaller quantities of inputs to produce their
outputs than insurers in the latter sample.
For the sample period 1989-1992, Fukuyama (1995) found average technical efficiency in the Japanese
life insurance industry to be about 0.91.  
Using the econometric frontier approach for the period 1980-1988, Cummins and Weiss (1993)
found average cost efficiencies in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry of 0.91 for large
insurers, 0.79 for medium-size insurers, and 0.88 for small insurers.
13  Yuengert (1993) used the
econometric approach to study cost efficiency in the U.S. life insurance industry.  Using 1989 data, he
found cost efficiencies ranging between 0.505 for small insurers to 0.655 for large insurers.
14   Although
it generally is not possible to compare efficiencies across frontiers based on different samples, this
review of previous DEA and econometric results for the insurance industry shows that our technical
efficiency results are within the ranges found by prior researchers.
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Productivity Change
Table 6 also shows the Malmquist productivity indices and the decomposition of these indices
into indices of technical efficiency change and technical change over the sample period.  Again, the
numbers reported are geometric means across the firms in the sample.  Unlike the technical efficiency
results in the table, however, which are based on the frontier for an indicated year, the Malmquist23
16In interpreting the cumulative results, the reader should be aware that the Malmquist
productivity index does not satisfy the Fisher circular test, i.e., if the Malmquist index were
calculated directly for the two years 1985 and 1993, the result would not necessarily equal the
cumulative index shown in Table 6.  However, the cumulative index number is still useful in
interpreting the productivity change over a multiple year period as long as this caveat is borne in
mind (Fare, et al., 1994) .
indices and its components compare changes across two-year periods ending in the indicated year.  For
example, the Malmquist results for 1986 show the change in productivity from 1985 to 1986 (see
equations (8) and (9)).  The 1986 Malmquist index (0.8648) shows a decline in productivity between
1985 and 1986 of about 13.5 percent ((1 minus 0.8648) times 100).  The efficiency change and technical
change results for this year imply that insurers became less efficient (efficiency change = 0.9481 < 1.0)
and experienced technological regress (technical change = 0.9121 < 1.0).  
The Malmquist indices in Table 6 show improvements in productivity in only three of the eight
two-year comparisons and productivity regress in five of the eight comparisons.  The geometric mean
productivity change for the period 1985-1993 (shown in the next to last row of the table) was 0.9650,
indicating that productivity declined on average during the period.  The cumulative effect of the
productivity decline during the 1985-1993 period is given in the last row of the table, 0.7522.  This
result, which is obtained by multiplying the eight geometric mean index numbers shown in the column,
implies a significant decrease in productivity over the period in the Italian insurance market.  It is
particularly noteworthy that large declines occurred in 1990 and 1993, both years that were affected by
deregulation.  This finding parallels Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1993), who found a decline in productivity
for Spanish savings banks over the period 1986-1991, when the banks were deregulated.  The geometric
mean result for their sample was 0.941 and the cumulative productivity change index was 0.738.
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The decomposition of the productivity change into technical efficiency change and technical
change is also shown in Table 6.  Efficiency change is close to 1.0 in most years, averaging 0.9991.  The24
cumulative effect of efficiency change is also slightly less than 1.0 (0.9925).  These results imply that
the technical efficiency of insurers in the Italian insurance industry remained about the same during the
sample period.  Most of the deterioration in productivity over the period is attributable to technical
change.  The technical change results show technological regress in five of the eight two-year
comparisons shown in the table.  The technical regress was most pronounced in 1986, 1990, and 1993.
The geometric mean technical change is 0.9659 and the cumulative effect of technical change on
productivity growth is 0.7579.  
The interpretation of the technical change indices is that the technology in the Italian industry
now requires more inputs to produce a given output vector than in 1985.  Thus, changes in technology
are needed if the industry is to become more productive.  Investigation of the subset of firms that have
made technical progress over the period might reveal best practice technologies that could be adopted
by other firms to improve their productivity.  
The findings illustrate one of the advantages of the frontier efficiency technique, i.e., the ability
to identify the degree of emphasis that should be placed on improving efficiency vs. technical change.
Although Italian firms could improve overall productivity by increasing their efficiency, the most
serious problem for the average firm seems to be declines in technical efficiency.  This suggests that
resources devoted to technical change might have a relatively high payoff for firms most affected by
the technical efficiency decline.
Ex Post Regression Analysis
We also conduct an ex post regression analysis with the technical efficiency scores as
dependent variables and various firm characteristics as independent variables.  The objective is to
provide information on firm characteristics that are related to efficiency.  These are generally
characteristics that are fixed or quasi-fixed over the sample period.  The underlying assumption is that25
17In principal, the dependent variable is also truncated at zero.  However, none of the
efficiency scores for the firms in our sample is close to zero.
all firms face the same technological production possibilities set but deviate from the frontier both
because of X-inefficiencies and because of fixed or quasi-fixed characteristics related to the type of firm
or the type of business emphasized.  For example, it is difficult for an insurer to change its
organizational form or distribution system except over relatively long periods of time.  Likewise, it is
rarely possible for firms to drastically change their scale over as short a period as ten years.  E.g., we
rarely observe firms moving from the lowest to the highest size quartile.  Business mix too is a quasi-
fixed factor for many firms because of the existence of private information on their policyholders and
the time required to develop underwriting  and marketing expertise in unfamiliar lines of business.  
The estimated regression equations for the Italian sample are presented in Table 7.  The
dependent variable is technical efficiency.  Pooled cross-section, time-series regressions are shown for
the period 1985-1993 based on two estimation techniques: ordinary least squares (OLS) and Tobit
analysis.  The Tobit approach is appropriate because the dependent variable is censored at 1.0 rather
than being uncensored as assumed by OLS.
17   The OLS results are shown for comparison, but the
discussion emphasizes the Tobit results.
To test for the effects of organizational form on efficiency, we use a dummy variable equal to
1 for mutual insurers and zero otherwise.  The results in Table 7 provide evidence that mutuals have
higher technical efficiency than stocks after controlling for other factors.  This finding does not support
the expense preference hypothesis, which holds that mutuals will be less efficient than stocks because
owners of mutuals have less control over managers than do the owners of stock insurers.  The finding
is consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis, which predicts that mutuals will be more
successful in activities requiring relatively low levels of managerial discretion.  Such lines of business26
18Readers please note:  we are currently collecting data on the distribution systems used
by Italian insurers, because this information is not available in public sources or from ANIA. 
Tests of hypotheses regarding distribution systems will appear in the next version of the paper.
19Scope economies could be present with respect to other outcome variables such as
revenues, perhaps offsetting the apparent technical disadvantage to conducting both life and non-
life insurance business.
tend to be more standardized and require less managerial expertise than the more complex types of
business conducted by stocks.  Thus, stocks may be inherently more likely to make mistakes in choosing
the approaches used to produce their outputs.  Our findings are consistent with those of Cummins, et
al. (1995), who found that mutual property-liability insurers in the U.S. are slightly more technically
efficient than stock insurers.  Fukuyama (1995) finds that stock and mutual life insurers in Japan have
approximately equal technical efficiency scores.
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The Tobit regressions show no relationship between business mix (proportions of business in
various categories) and efficiency scores.  This is to be expected since insurance output variables were
used in constructing the frontiers.  However, firms that conduct both life and non-life insurance business
are significantly less efficient than those that specialize in either life or non-life insurance.  This
suggests that economies of scope may not be an important factor in this market, at least with respect to
technical efficiency.
19
The proportions of direct insurance premiums to total insurance premiums for life and non-life
insurance are entered to control for the effect of reinsurance on efficiency.  Direct insurance premiums
are those received as a result of selling insurance in the primary insurance market, whereas total
premiums equal direct premiums plus premiums for reinsurance assumed (reinsurance sold to other
insurers) minus premiums for reinsurance ceded (reinsurance bought from other insurers). The
reinsurance variables are decreasing in reinsurance assumed and increasing in reinsurance ceded.  The
ratio of non-life direct premiums to total non-life premiums is positive and highly significant in both27
the OLS and Tobit regressions.  The comparable life insurance variable has a positive coefficient in all
four equations shown in Table 7, but is statistically significant  only in models 2 and 4.   Firms that are
net reinsurers thus appear to be less efficient than firms that are net purchasers of reinsurance.  This is
consistent with the observation that reinsurance is a more risky and more complex type of coverage than
direct insurance, with greater consequent opportunities to choose suboptimal technologies.   
Asset portfolio mix variables are included in the equation as control variables to recognize the
potential effects of different types of assets on efficiency.  The results show that assets requiring more
active management, such as real estate and common stocks, are associated with lower firm efficiencies
than those requiring less active management such as bonds.  This is shown by the larger coefficients
on the real estate and stock variables in comparison with the coefficient on the bond variable.  The
coefficients on the mortgage variables represent an intermediate case between bonds and real
estate/stocks, but the mortgage variables are not statistically significant.  (The omitted category of assets
consists primarily of cash and short-term debt.)  Again, the implication seems to be that more complex
operations requiring more managerial skill and discretion are associated with lower efficiency.
The ratio of invested assets to total assets also is included in the regressions.  Non-invested
assets for insurers consist primarily of receivables from agents, reinsurers, and policyholders as well
as computer equipment and fixed assets other than real estate.  The results indicate that insurers with
higher ratios of invested to total assets tend to be more technically efficient.  These firms may be less
effective at managing receivables and also may be involved in more complex operations involving
longer claims settlement times that lead to delays in payment by reinsurers.
The ratios of claims paid to premiums for life and non-life insurance were entered to control for
differences in claims payment patterns.  The results imply that insurers with higher ratios of claims paid
to premiums tend to be more efficient.  In life insurance, higher claims to premium ratios are associated28
with insurers that write more short-term life insurance and firms that write longer-term (e.g., whole life)
insurance but are relatively mature (i.e., have an older policyholder base).  Short-term policies tend to
be more standardized and less complex, while relatively new companies are more likely to be in the
learning phase with respect to some aspects of their production technology.  In non-life insurance,
higher ratios of paid claims to premiums are associated with lines of business (such as automobile
property insurance) where claims settlement is relatively prompt and claims settlement costs are low.
The higher complexity associated with claims that have longer settlement periods and are more
susceptible to moral hazard provides more opportunities for firms to make mistakes in using
technology.  Higher claim payment ratios may also be indicative of a firm's superior effectiveness in
handling claims of a given type.  
Finally, our scale variable, total insurance output, is statistically significant when the claims paid
ratios are excluded from the equations (models 2 and 4) but not when the claims ratios are included.
This reinforces the interpretation of the claims variables as capturing (among other possible effects) the
impact of firm maturity on efficiency.
The variables in the regressions explain about 40 percent of the variability in technical efficiency
in the Italian insurance industry.  Thus, there is a wide dispersion in efficiency scores within the industry
even after accounting for differences in firm characteristics.  This again suggests that there is substantial
room for improvement in technical efficiency that might be achieved if the less efficient firms were to
adopt the best practice technologies of the firms operating on the frontier.  
Although it is tempting to conclude that the dispersion in efficiency in the Italian market is
attributable to a lack of competition, it is doubtful that this factor accounts for all of the dispersion in
efficiency.  Several researchers have found comparable ranges of efficiency in the U.S. market, which
most economists believe to be competitive (Cummins and Weiss, 1993, Gardner and Grace, 1993,29
Yuengert, 1993).  At least part of the dispersion in efficiency is likely to be attributable to product
heterogeneity, slow diffusion of information, and private information held by both buyers and sellers
that allow inefficient firms to remain in the market (Berger, Kleindorfer, and Kunreuther, 1986, Dahlby
and West, 1986).  It will be interesting to observe whether the dispersion in efficiency in the Italian
insurance market is reduced as competition increases in the years to come.  
6. Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines technical efficiency and productivity growth in the Italian insurance
market.  The market has undergone significant deregulation in 1990, when banks were first permitted
to own controlling interests in insurers, and since 1992, when implementation of European economic
unity began.  We measure technical efficiency and productivity growth by estimating production
frontiers based on a sample of 94 Italian insurers for the period 1985-1993.  We estimate input-oriented
distance functions using data envelopment analysis (DEA).  Productivity growth is measured using
Malmquist indices, which are decomposed into technical efficiency change and technical change.
The results indicate that technical efficiency in the Italian insurance industry ranged from 70 to
78 percent during the sample period.  There was almost no efficiency change over the sample period,
i.e., on average Italian insurers operated at about the same distance from the production frontier
throughout the sample period.  However, productivity declined significantly over the sample period,
with a cumulative decline of about 25 percent.  The decline was attributable almost exclusively to
technological regress, implying that insurers needed more inputs to produce their outputs at the end of
the sample period than at the beginning.  Although improvements in both technical efficiency and
technical change appear to be needed, the main problem at present appears to be the adverse shift in the
production frontier.
Although the sources of the technical regress characterizing the Italian industry are not entirely30
20Recall that what we are estimating is a "best practice" frontier rather than the attainable
but unobserved true production possibilities frontier.
clear, this phenomenon has been observed in at least one other financial services industry (Spanish
savings banks) that experienced deregulation and growth in new products and distribution systems
(Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1993).  In a dynamically changing environment, many insurers may be
adopting new approaches to producing their outputs.  This provides more opportunities for firms to
make mistakes in the choice of technology, perhaps leading to excessive consumption of inputs even
by "best practice" firms.
20  An increase in the complexity of insurance products and markets could  have
a similar effect.  As firms become more experienced at operating in the new environment and the initial
false-starts in the adoption of new technology have been corrected, the productivity of the Italian
insurance industry can be expected to improve.  The increase in competition resulting from deregulation
should reinforce this process, as firms that fail to improve are likely to be penalized by the market.REFERENCES
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Figure 1: Malmquist Input-Based Index of Total Factor Productivity
And Input Distance Functions35
TABLE 1
      INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF INSURANCE MARKETS
Countries Premiums in U.S. Dollars (Millions) Percent of Total Premiums GDP in U.S.
Non-Life Business Life Business Totals Non-Life Business Life Business Dollars (Millions)
U.S.A. 305,955 216,513 522,468 58.6 41.4 6,005,379
Japan 83,701 236,442 320,143 26.1 73.9 3,766,388
Germany 65,105 42,298 107,403 60.6 39.4 1,851,776
Great Britain 36,270 66,090 102,360 35.4 64.6 905,841
France 36,622 47,681 84,303 43.4 56.6 1,258,254
Italy 22,330 8,504 30,834 72.4 27.6 1,022,723
Canada 18,267 16,157 34,424 53.1 46.9 537,875
Holland 12,178 13,865 26,043 46.8 53.2 310,036
Spain 13,735 7,065 20,800 66.0 34.0 507,317
Switzerland 8,492 11,677 20,169 42.1 57.9 234,523
Australia 9,096 10,544 19,640 46.3 53.7 272,778
Sweden 5,633 5,793 11,426 49.3 50.7 204,036
Belgium 7,031 3,562 10,593 66.4 33.6 211,860
Austria 6,272 2,754 9,026 69.5 30.5 180,520
Denmark 3,459 3,076 6,535 52.9 47.1 139,043
Finland 2,083 3,915 5,998 34.7 65.3 90,879
Norway 3,222 2,349 5,571 57.8 42.2 101,291
Ireland 1,867 2,490 4,357 42.9 57.2 47,879
Portugal 2,087 853 2,940 71.0 29.0 77,368
New Zealand 1,487 1,078 2,565 58.0 42.0 40,078
Greece 670 618 1,288 52.0 48.0 67,789
Luxembourg 335 420 755 44.4 55.6 9,557
Averages 52.3 47.7
Countries Premiums as Percentage of GDP Premiums per Capita in U.S. Dollars
Non-Life Business Life Business Totals Non-Life Business Life Business Totals
U.S.A. 5.1 3.6 8.7 1,210.8 856.8 2,067.6
Japan 2.2 6.3 8.5 673.5 1,902.6 2,576.1
Germany 3.5 2.3 5.8 805.8 523.5 1,329.3
Great Britain 4.0 7.3 11.3 627.0 1,142.4 1,769.4
France 2.9 3.8 6.7 638.4 831.1 1,469.5
Italy 2.2 0.8 3.0 393.0 149.7 542.7
Canada 3.4 3.0 6.4 665.7 588.8 1,254.5
Holland 3.9 4.5 8.4 802.2 913.4 1,715.6
Spain 2.7 1.4 4.1 351.5 180.8 532.3
Switzerland 3.6 5.0 8.6 1,230.8 1,692.3 2,923.1
Australia 3.3 3.9 7.2 518.9 601.5 1,120.4
Sweden 2.8 2.8 5.6 649.0 667.4 1,316.4
Belgium 3.3 1.7 5.0 703.1 356.2 1,059.3
Austria 3.5 1.5 5.0 796.0 349.4 1,145.4
Denmark 2.5 2.2 4.7 669.1 595.0 1,264.1
Finland 2.3 4.3 6.6 413.2 776.9 1,190.1
Norway 3.2 2.3 5.5 751.1 547.6 1,298.7
Ireland 3.9 5.2 9.1 526.0 701.3 1,227.3
Portugal 2.7 1.1 3.8 211.9 86.6 298.5
New Zealand 3.7 2.7 6.4 436.0 316.2 752.2
Greece 1.0 0.9 1.9 65.1 60.0 125.1
Luxembourg 3.5 4.4 7.9 858.3 1,076.3 1,934.6
Averages 3.1 3.2 6.4 636.2 678.0 1,314.2
Source: Associazione Nazionale fra le Impresse Assicurazioni (ANIA).36
TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF PREMIUMS BY LINE OF BUSINESS: ITALIAN INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Aviation Auto Personal  
YEAR Perils Property Bond Credit Theft Hail Fire Accident Health
ABSOLUTE VALUES (Million ITL)
1984 82,835 1,260,848 269,099 128,987 469,872 209,802 1,219,641 1,202,319 237,724
1985 95,953 1,451,962 289,984 164,099 531,453 240,417 1,387,804 1,384,737 293,476
1986 114,710 1,667,755 305,918 198,444 601,414 282,496 1,549,326 1,602,087 361,632
1987 124,852 1,926,725 339,997 195,028 710,596 380,448 1,773,105 1,846,428 461,687
1988 127,775 2,236,434 354,869 219,126 781,578 396,603 1,910,128 2,123,781 582,651
1989 141,781 2,650,573 370,586 241,263 880,736 417,962 2,126,091 2,404,431 731,651
1990 155,029 3,068,892 392,895 273,529 988,964 501,778 2,328,776 2,714,481 918,782
1991 154,178 3,564,011 423,405 300,415 1,069,815 443,799 2,631,706 3,049,339 1,106,130
1992 150,284 4,116,281 434,723 330,092 1,160,067 488,287 2,890,757 3,305,318 1,314,876
1993 202,797 4,230,980 424,883 334,011 1,191,204 347,753 3,123,414 3,483,702 1,512,964
PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTALS
1984 0.58 8.84 1.89 0.90 3.29 1.47 8.55 8.43 1.67
1985 0.58 8.71 1.74 0.98 3.19 1.44 8.32 8.30 1.76
1986 0.59 8.51 1.56 1.01 3.07 1.44 7.91 8.17 1.85
1987 0.54 8.35 1.47 0.85 3.08 1.65 7.68 8.00 2.00
1988 0.49 8.57 1.36 0.84 2.99 1.52 7.32 8.13 2.23
1989 0.48 8.92 1.25 0.81 2.96 1.41 7.16 8.09 2.46
1990 0.45 8.98 1.15 0.80 2.89 1.47 6.81 7.94 2.69
1991 0.39 8.96 1.07 0.76 2.69 1.12 6.62 7.67 2.78
1992 0.33 9.08 0.96 0.73 2.56 1.08 6.37 7.29 2.90
1993 0.40 8.42 0.85 0.66 2.37 0.69 6.22 6.93 3.01
Averages 0.48 8.73 1.33 0.83 2.91 1.33 7.30 7.90 2.33
INDEX NUMBERS 1984=100
1985 115.84 115.16 107.76 127.22 113.11 114.59 113.79 115.17 123.45
1986 138.48 132.27 113.68 153.85 128.00 134.65 127.03 133.25 152.12
1987 150.72 152.81 126.35 151.20 151.23 181.34 145.38 153.57 194.21
1988 154.25 177.38 131.87 169.88 166.34 189.04 156.61 176.64 245.10
1989 171.16 210.22 137.71 187.04 187.44 199.22 174.32 199.98 307.77
1990 187.15 243.40 146.00 212.06 210.48 239.17 190.94 225.77 386.49
1991 186.13 282.67 157.34 232.90 227.68 211.53 215.78 253.62 465.30
1992 181.43 326.47 161.55 255.91 246.89 232.74 237.02 274.91 553.11
1993 244.82 335.57 157.89 258.95 253.52 165.75 256.09 289.75 636.44
                               ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES 
1984 29.46 17.35 19.07 33.86 13.63 14.48 11.95 17.93 29.38
1985 15.84 15.16 7.76 27.22 13.11 14.59 13.79 15.17 23.45
1986 19.55 14.86 5.49 20.93 13.16 17.50 11.64 15.70 23.22
1987 8.84 15.53 11.14 -1.72 18.15 34.67 14.44 15.25 27.67
1988 2.34 16.07 4.37 12.36 9.99 4.25 7.73 15.02 26.20
1989 10.96 18.52 4.43 10.10 12.69 5.39 11.31 13.21 25.57
1990 9.34 15.78 6.02 13.37 12.29 20.05 9.53 12.89 25.58
1991 -0.55 16.13 7.77 9.83 8.18 -11.55 13.01 12.34 20.39
1992 -2.53 15.50 2.67 9.88 8.44 10.02 9.84 8.39 18.87
1993 34.94 2.79 -2.26 1.19 2.68 -28.78 8.05 5.40 15.07
Averages 12.82 14.77 6.65 13.70 11.23 8.06 11.13 13.13 23.54
Source: Associazione Nazionale fra le Impresse Assicurazioni (ANIA).37
TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF PREMIUMS BY LINE: CONTINUED
Pecuniary     General  Compulsory Legal     Other Total Life and 
Loss Liability Auto Liability Marine Defence Lines Non-Life  Capitalization TOTALS
13,958 672,134 5,806,901 623,399 14,962 122,271 12,334,752 1,933,293 14,268,045
25,520 799,852 6,702,477 556,051 17,058 140,564 14,081,407 2,598,063 16,679,470
33,119 940,205 7,624,839 556,486 20,505 155,353 16,014,289 3,583,616 19,597,905
44,110 1,132,736 8,299,198 634,749 25,598 189,251 18,084,508 4,993,578 23,078,086
55,086 1,255,866 8,837,501 691,014 30,336 202,989 19,805,737 6,303,721 26,109,458
76,294 1,455,289 9,845,002 754,693 34,119 241,566 22,372,037 7,332,458 29,704,495
69,110 1,655,274 11,272,785 854,692 38,406 275,899 25,509,292 8,677,087 34,186,379
68,878 1,874,248 13,052,346 1,018,415 48,439 352,721 29,157,845 10,597,575 39,755,420
66,021 2,121,188 14,689,500 1,267,743 79,119 430,971 32,845,227 12,508,264 45,353,491
60,740 2,329,263 15,840,987 1,447,058 99,709 480,721 35,110,186 15,143,042 50,253,228
0.10 4.71 40.70 4.37 0.10 0.86 86.45 13.55 100.00
0.15 4.80 40.18 3.33 0.10 0.84 84.42 15.58 100.00
0.17 4.80 38.91 2.84 0.10 0.79 81.71 18.29 100.00
0.19 4.91 35.96 2.75 0.11 0.82 78.36 21.64 100.00
0.21 4.81 33.85 2.65 0.12 0.78 75.86 24.14 100.00
0.26 4.90 33.14 2.54 0.11 0.81 75.32 24.68 100.00
0.20 4.84 32.97 2.50 0.11 0.81 74.62 25.38 100.00
0.17 4.71 32.83 2.56 0.12 0.89 73.34 26.66 100.00
0.15 4.68 32.39 2.80 0.17 0.95 72.42 27.58 100.00
0.12 4.64 31.52 2.88 0.20 0.96 69.87 30.13 100.00
0.17 4.78 35.25 2.92 0.13 0.85 77.24 22.76 100.00
182.83 119.00 115.42 89.20 114.01 114.96 114.16 134.39 116.90
237.28 139.88 131.31 89.27 137.05 127.06 129.83 185.36 137.36
316.02 168.53 142.92 101.82 171.09 154.78 146.61 258.29 161.75
394.66 186.85 152.19 110.85 202.75 166.02 160.57 326.06 182.99
546.60 216.52 169.54 121.06 228.04 197.57 181.37 379.27 208.19
495.13 246.27 194.13 137.10 256.69 225.65 206.81 448.82 239.60
493.47 278.85 224.77 163.36 323.75 288.47 236.39 548.16 278.63
473.00 315.59 252.97 203.36 528.80 352.47 266.28 646.99 317.87
435.16 346.55 272.80 232.12 666.41 393.16 284.64 783.28 352.21
24.12 18.34 19.71 12.77 14.41 24.26 18.10 28.82 19.44
82.83 19.00 15.42 -10.80 14.01 14.96 14.16 34.39 16.90
29.78 17.55 13.76 0.08 20.21 10.52 13.73 37.93 17.50
33.19 20.48 8.84 14.06 24.84 21.82 12.93 39.34 17.76
24.88 10.87 6.49 8.86 18.51 7.26 9.52 26.24 13.14
38.50 15.88 11.40 9.22 12.47 19.00 12.96 16.32 13.77
-9.42 13.74 14.50 13.25 12.56 14.21 14.02 18.34 15.09
-0.34 13.23 15.79 19.16 26.12 27.84 14.30 22.13 16.29
-4.15 13.18 12.54 24.48 63.34 22.18 12.65 18.03 14.08
-8.00 9.81 7.84 14.14 26.02 11.54 6.90 21.06 10.80
21.14 15.21 12.63 10.52 23.25 17.36 12.93 26.26 15.4838
TABLE 3
                        THE DISTRIBUTION OF INSURERS BY ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
ITALIAN COMPANIES ITALIAN 
YEARS PUBLIC PRIVATE  COMPANIES ITALIAN  FOREIGN  AND  FOREIGN
BODIES Stocks Cooperatives Mutuals TOTALS COMPANIES COMPANIES COMPANIES
TOTALS TOTALS
1984 2 145 1 15 161 163 50 213
1985 2 143 1 15 159 161 51 212
1986 2 146 1 13 160 162 54 216
1987 2 152 1 13 166 168 56 224
1988 2 170 1 12 183 185 57 242
1989 2 177 1 12 190 192 56 248
1990 2 185 1 12 198 200 52 252
1991 2 195 1 12 208 210 54 264
1992 - 205 1 12 218 218 50 268
1993 - 211 1 12 224 224 50 274
Source: Associazione Nazionale fra le Impresse Assicurazioni (ANIA).
     TABLE 4
MARKET SHARES BY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION  Life and Non-Life Life Business Non-Life Business
1992 Premiums Market Premiums Market Premiums Market
(in ITL Billions) Share (in ITL Billions) Share (in ITL Billions) Share
Agents 31,772 70.1% 6,942 55.5% 24,830 75.6%
Brokers 5,398 11.9% 438 3.5% 4,960 15.1%
Direct Sales Force 5,004 11.0% 2,639 21.1% 2,365 7.2%
Banks and Financial Consultants 3,179 7.0% 2,489 19.9% 690 2.1%
Source: Associazione Nazionale fra le Impresse Assicurazioni (ANIA).39
         TABLE 5
SUMMARY STATISTICS: 94 FIRM SAMPLE
NON-LIFE LIFE LIFE &
VARIABLE ALL ONLY ONLY NON-LIFE
OUTPUTS
LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS
+ CHANGES IN RESERVES 288 0 669 826
NONLIFE: INCURRED LOSSES
   AUTO PROPERTY 129 69 0 428
   AUTO LIABILITY 706 367 0 2,375
   OTHER PROPERTY 1,550 623 0 5,765
   OTHER LIABILITY 83 32 0 313
INVESTED ASSETS 6,748 1,101 13,232 18,183
INPUTS
ACQUISITION LABOR EXPENSE 602 196 596 1,845
ADMINISTRATIVE LABOR EXPENSE 206 87 141 630
FIXED CAPITAL 272 106 296 756
EQUITY CAPITAL 1,534 280 2,184 4,778
OTHER VARIABLES
DIRECT PREM/TOTAL PREM -- LIFE 0.934 0.942 0.951
DIRECT PREM/TOTAL PREM -- NONLIF 0.375 0.982 0.970
PREMIUM TO SURPLUS -- LIFE 1.285 5.469 1.464
PREMIUM TO SURPLUS -- NONLIFE 6.349 9.409 2.690
RATIO OF BONDS TO ASSETS 0.385 0.323 0.521 0.454
RATIO OF STOCK TO ASSETS 0.039 0.033 0.030 0.063
RATIO OF MORTGAGE TO ASSETS 0.008 0.004 0.015 0.011
RATIO OF REAL EST. TO ASSETS 0.104 0.110 0.048 0.134
LOSSES PD/ PREMIUMS -- LIFE 0.030 0.021 0.128
LOSSES PD/ PREMIUMS -- NONLIFE 0.663 0.662 0.700
RATIO OF INVESTED ASSETS  0.612 0.553 0.685 0.724
TO TOTAL ASSETS
NUMBER OF COMPANIES 94 58 17 19
NOTE:  All monetary variables are in billions of Italian Lira.40
TABLE 6:  TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND MALMQUIST INDICES: 1986-1993
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY TECHNICAL MALMQUIST
YEAR EFFICIENCY CHANGE CHANGE INDEX
1986 0.7075 0.9481 0.9121 0.8648
s.d. 0.2554 0.2386 0.2374 0.3954
min 0.1305 0.2783 0.5158 0.1436
max 1 1.9939 2.3138 3.0144
No. cases >= 1 28 50 22 27
1987 0.7052 1.0047 1.0473 1.0522
s.d. 0.2433 0.196 0.1921 0.29
min 0.1468 0.5502 0.3312 0.3312
max 1 1.76 1.4277 2.3949
No. cases >= 1 22 60 78 64
1988 0.7191 1.0093 0.9681 0.9771
s.d. 0.2607 0.2482 0.2324 0.4047
min 0.1666 0.3771 0.3596 0.1518
max 1 2.1685 3.7507 3.7507
No. cases >= 1 24 62 44 48
1989 0.7579 1.0811 1.0561 1.1417
s.d. 0.2342 0.1988 0.2077 0.3419
min 0.2263 0.7259 0.6584 0.6093
max 1 2.6635 2.5541 4.6483
No. cases >= 1 30 71 52 58
1990 0.7242 0.9441 0.8896 0.8399
s.d. 0.2412 0.2489 0.1443 0.3076
min 0.1566 0.3314 0.4789 0.3107
max 1 1.8386 1.2848 1.7192
No. cases >= 1 26 52 12 24
1991 0.7755 1.0701 1.0047 1.0751
s.d. 0.2427 0.2047 0.1826 0.312
min 0.1491 0.5814 0.4944 0.4932
max 1 2.278 1.4357 2.1496
No. cases >= 1 34 74 47 55
1992 0.7694 0.9907 0.9507 0.9419
s.d. 0.241 0.1359 0.0986 0.1869
min 0.1264 0.5585 0.7534 0.4634
max 1 1.8523 1.4237 2.0848
No. cases >= 1 31 60 20 26
1993 0.7397 0.954 0.9133 0.8713
s.d. 0.2492 0.1793 0.2513 0.3436
min 0.1454 0.5763 0.4478 0.2793
max 1 1.6064 3.771 3.2319
No. cases >= 1 29 53 31 30
Geometric Mean: 1985-9 0.7370 0.9991 0.9659 0.9650
Cumulative: 1985-93 0.9925 0.7579 0.7522
NOTE: For 1985, average technical efficiency was 0.738, with a standard deviation of 0.2554
minimum of 0. 192, maximum of 1.0, and 30 companies with technical efficiency = 1.0.41
TABLE 7:  REGRESSION RESULTS: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES AND TOBIT
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY)
OLS Tobit Analysis
VARIABLE Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
INTERCEPT 0.902 1.050 7.729 8.083
5.395 6.191 0.000 0.000
TOTAL INSURANCE OUTPUT 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.011
1.380 3.502 0.918 9.020
MUTUAL 0.087 0.081 0.132 0.133
3.649 3.322 6.809 6.808
LIFE PREMIUMS/TOTAL PREMIUMS -0.052 -0.125 0.320 0.039
-0.343 -0.808 1.201 0.016
AUTO LIABILITY PREMIUMS -0.503 -0.372 -8.835 -8.620
/TOTAL PREMIUMS -2.597 -1.883 0.000 0.000
OTHER LONG-TAIL NON-LIFE  -0.140 -0.102 -7.639 -7.612
PREMIUMS/TOTAL PREMIUMS -0.601 -0.426 0.000 0.000
OTHER SHORT-TAIL NON-LIFE -0.812 -0.812 -9.273 -9.311
PREMIUMS/TOTAL PREMIUMS -4.375 -4.258 0.000 0.000
DUMMY = 1 IF FIRM DOES BOTH -0.251 -0.267 -0.428 -0.604
LIFE AND NON-LIFE BUSINESS -2.243 -2.326 4.556 8.084
DIRECT NON-LIFE PREMIUMS 0.447 0.462 1.114 1.125
/TOTAL PREMIUMS 4.781 4.840 39.767 37.829
DIRECT LIFE PREMIUMS 0.225 0.292 0.296 0.572
/TOTAL PREMIUMS 1.890 2.428 1.742 6.386
BONDS/TOTAL ASSETS -0.323 -0.292 -0.858 -0.759
-4.111 -3.627 26.899 20.341
STOCKS/TOTAL ASSETS -0.935 -0.869 -2.600 -2.502
-5.339 -4.847 69.757 60.757
MORTGAGES/TOTAL ASSETS -0.734 -0.787 -0.210 -1.808
-1.322 -1.378 3.476 2.458
REAL ESTATE/TOTAL ASSETS -1.190 -1.144 -2.820 -2.649
-9.978 -9.384 119.566 102.957
CLAIMS PAID/PREMIUMS: NON-LIFE 0.233 0.459
5.282 17.580
CLAIMS PAID/PREMIUMS: LIFE 0.441 0.603
3.384 4.979
INVESTED ASSETS/TOTAL ASSETS 27.592 14.195 80.303 48.830
3.940 2.116 24.587 10.839
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.396 0.361
LOG-LIKELIHOOD -456.789 -470.282
Note: Total Insurance Output in Billions of Italian Lire.  Numbers below OLS coefficients are 
t-statistics.  Numbers below Tobit coefficients are Chi-Square statistics.
Chi-Square statistics.  Chi-square critical values:  5 % level = 3.841; 1 % level = 6.635.